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INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first century’s information age has the potential to
usher in a more harmonious and productive politics. People often
disagree about what policies to adopt, but the cornucopia of data
that modern technology generates can allow them to better update
their beliefs about policy outcomes on the basis of shared facts. In
the long run, convergence on the facts can lead incrementally to
more consensus on better policies. More credible factual information
should over time also help make for a less divisive society, because
partisans cannot as easily stoke social tensions by relying on false
facts or exaggerated claims to support conflicting positions. Thus, a
central task of contemporary public law is to accelerate a politics of
learning whereby democracy improves a public reason focused on
evaluating policy consequences. 
Government should be shaped into an instrument that learns
from the analysis of policy consequences made available from newly
available technologies of information.1 Greater computer capacity is
generating more empirical analysis.2 The Internet permits the rise
of prediction markets that forecast policy results even before the
policies are implemented.3 The Internet also creates a dispersed
media that specializes in particular topics and methodologies,
gathers diverse information, and funnels salient facts about policy
to legislators and citizens.4
But a public reason focused on policy consequences will improve
only if our laws facilitate it. For instance, constitutional federalism
must be reinvigorated to permit greater experimentation across
jurisdictions, because with the rise of empiricism, decentralization
has more value for social learning today than ever before.5 Congress
should include mandates for experiments within its own legislation,
1. The premise of this project is that more information can help democracy update on the
facts—an assumption I support in Debiasing Democracy. John O. McGinnis, Debiasing
Democracy (May 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See infra Part III.A.1.
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making policy initiatives contain the platforms for their own self-
improvement.6
Creating a contemporary politics of democratic updating on the
basis of facts is a matter both of great historical interest and of
enormous importance to our future. In the historical sweep of ideas,
a government more focused on learning from new information
moves toward fulfilling the Enlightenment dream of a politics of
reason—but a reason based not on the abstractions of the French
Revolution, but instead on the hard facts of the more empirical
tradition predominating in Britain. By displacing religion from the
center of politics, the Enlightenment removed issues by their nature
not susceptible to factual resolution, permitting a focus on policies
that could be improved by information.7 The better democratic
updating afforded by modern technology can similarly increase
social harmony and prosperity by facilitating policies that actually
deliver the goods. 
For the future, a more consequentially informed politics is an
urgent necessity. The same technological acceleration that poten-
tially creates a more information-rich politics also generates a wide
range of technological innovation—from nanotechnology to biotech-
nology to artificial intelligence. Although these technologies offer
unparalleled benefits to mankind, they may also create catastrophic
risks, such as rapid environmental degradation and new weapons
of mass destruction.8 Only a democracy able to rapidly assimilate
the facts is likely to be able to avoid disaster and reap the benefits
inherent in the technology that is transforming our world at a faster
pace than ever before. 
Every industry that touches on information—book publishing,
newspapers, and college education to name just a few—is undergo-
ing a continuous series of revolutionary changes as new technology
permits delivery of more information more quickly at lower cost.
The same changes that are creating innovation in such private
industries can also quickly create innovation in social governance.
But the difference between information-intensive private industries
6. See, e.g., infra Part IV.
7. See John Witte, Jr., The Theology and Politics of the First Amendment Religion
Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489, 495 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Keith Johnson, Bioscience Gains Cause Terror Fears, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11,
2010, at A4.
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and political institutions is that the latter lack the strong competi-
tive framework for these revolutions to occur spontaneously. This
Essay thus attempts to set out a blueprint for reform to make better
use of some available information technologies. 
Part I describes the reality of technology acceleration as the accel-
eration both creates the tools for democratic updating and prompts
its necessity. Technological acceleration is the most important
development of our time—more important even than globalization.
Although technologists have described and discussed its signifi-
cance, its implications for law and political structure have been
barely noticed.
Part II briefly discusses how better social knowledge can change
political results. A premise of the claim is that some political dis-
agreements revolve about facts, not simply values. As a result,
better social knowledge can help democracies design policies to
achieve widely shared goals. Social knowledge energizes citizens to
act on those encompassing interests, like improved public education,
because they come to better recognize the policy instruments to
advance those interests. Better social knowledge provides better
incentives for citizens to vote on these interests. 
Part III considers the mechanisms for creating a contemporary
politics of democratic updating that begins to meet the needs of the
age of accelerating technology. It focuses on two of the new re-
sources that can have substantial synergies in improving social
common knowledge and shows how an increase in common knowl-
edge can systematically improve political results by providing better
incentives for citizens to work for encompassing social goods. First,
Part III considers the improvement in empirical analysis of social
policy that flows from increasing computational capacity. It then
discusses how specialized and innovative media does much more
than disseminate opinions: it widely distributes facts and factual
analysis. The combination of these technologies can better discipline
experts and representatives, providing stronger incentives for them
to update on the basis of new facts.
Part IV discusses the information-eliciting rules that will max-
imize the impact of new technologies of information. These steps
include a program of restoring, where possible, governmental struc-
tures that permit appropriate decentralization for experimentation,
empirical testing, and learning. Congress and regulatory agencies
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should structure legislation and regulations to include social
experiments when such experiments would help resolve disputed
matters of policy. The Supreme Court should generally refrain from
imposing new substantive rights for the nation so that it is easier to
evaluate the consequences of different bundles of rights chosen by
the states. But it should also protect the dispersed media, like blogs,
from discriminatory laws, because this dispersed media plays a
crucial role in modern policy evaluation. In short, the Supreme
Court needs to emphasize a jurisprudence fostering social discovery
and the political branches need to create frameworks for better
social learning. Constitutive structures encouraging and evaluating
experimentation become more valuable in an age where better
evaluation of social experiments is possible. 
I. TECHNOLOGICAL ACCELERATION
It is the premise of this Essay that technological acceleration is
occurring and that our political system must adapt to the world it
is creating. The case for technological acceleration rests on three
mutually supporting kinds of evidence. First, from the longest-term
perspective, epochal change has sped up: the transitions from
hunter-gatherer society to agricultural society to the industrial age
each took progressively less time to occur, and our transition to an
information society is taking less time still. Second, from a technol-
ogical perspective, computational power is increasing exponentially,
and increasing computational power facilitates the growth of other
society-changing technologies like biotechnology and nanotech-
nology. Third, even from our contemporary perspective, technology
now changes the world on a yearly basis both in terms of hard data,
like the amount of information created, and in terms of more sub-
jective measures, like the social changes wrought by social media. 
From the longest-term perspective, it seems clear that technologi-
cal change is accelerating and, with it, the basic shape of human
society and culture is changing.9 Anthropologists suggest that for
100,000 years, members of the human species were hunter-gather-
9. See generally Robin Hanson, Economics of the Singularity, IEEE SPECTRUM (June
2008), http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/robotics-software/economics-of-the-singularity.
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ers.10 About 10,000 years ago humans made a transition to agricul-
tural society.11 With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, the
West transformed itself into a society that thrived on manufactur-
ing.12 Since 1950, the world has been rapidly entering the informa-
tion age.13 Each of the completed epochs has been marked by a
transition to substantially higher growth rates.14 The period
between each epoch has become very substantially shorter.15 Thus,
there is reason to extrapolate to even more and faster transitions in
the future. 
This evolution is consistent with a more fine-grained evaluation
of human development. Recently, the historian Ian Morris has rated
societies in the last 15,000 years on their level of development
through objective benchmarks, such as energy capture.16 The graph
shows relatively steady, if modest, growth when plotted on a log
linear scale, but in the last 100 years development has jumped to
become sharply exponential.17 Morris concludes that these patterns
suggest that there may be four times as much social development in
the world in the next 100 years than there has been in the last
14,000.18
The inventor and engineer Ray Kurzweil has dubbed this phe-
nomenon of faster transitions “the law of accelerating returns.”19
Seeking to strengthen the case for exponential change, he has
looked back to the dawn of life to show that even evolution seems to
make transitions to higher organisms ever faster.20 In a more
granulated way, he has considered important events of the last 1000
10. NICHOLAS WADE, BEFORE THE DAWN: RECOVERING THE LOST HISTORY OF OUR
ANCESTORS 8-9 (2006). 
11. Id. at 125. 
12. See DAVID A. HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCTION 1800-
1932: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 15-46
(1984). 
13. See generally Hanson, supra note 9.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See IAN MORRIS, WHY THE WEST RULES—FOR NOW: THE PATTERNS OF HISTORY, AND
WHAT THEY REVEAL ABOUT THE FUTURE 156 fig.3.1 (2010).
17. Id. at 166 fig.3.7. 
18. Id. at 590. 
19. RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 35
(2005). 
20. Id. at 14-21. 
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years to show that the periods between extraordinary advances,
such as great scientific discoveries and technological inventions,
have decreased.21 Thus, both outside and within the great epochs of
recorded human history, the story of acceleration is similar. 
The technology of computation provides the second perspective on
accelerating change. The easiest way to grasp this perspective is to
consider Moore’s Law. Moore’s Law—named after Gordon Moore,
one of the founders of Intel—is the observation that the number of
transistors that can be fitted onto a computer chip doubles every
eighteen months to two years.22 This prediction, which has been
approximately accurate for the last forty years,23 means that almost
every aspect of the digital world—from computational calculation
power to computer memory—is growing in density at a similarly
exponential rate.24 Moore’s Law reflects the rapid rise of computers
to become the fundamental engine of mankind in the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries.25
The power of exponential growth is hard to overstate. As the
economist Robert Lucas has said, once you start thinking about
exponential growth, it is hard to think about anything else.26 The
computational power in a cell phone today is a thousand times
greater and a million times less expensive than all the computing
power housed at MIT in 1965.27 Projecting forward, the computing
power of computers twenty-five years from now is likely to prove a
million times more powerful than computing power today.28
21. Id. at 18-20. 
22. See Moore’s Law Inspires Intel Innovation, INTEL CORP., http://www.intel.com/
technology/mooreslaw (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
23. See id. (“Intel ... has maintained this pace for decades.”).
24. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1620 n.147 (2003). 
25. Cf. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 352-62 (Penguin Books 2010)
(1918). 
26. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY
ECON. 3, 5 (1988). 
27. See Ray Kurzweil, Making the World a Billion Times Better, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
2008, at B4. 
28. Id.; see also HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT: MERE MACHINE TO TRANSCENDENT MIND 23
(1999) (“In less than fifty years, inexpensive computers will match and exceed—in raw
information-processing power—even the well-developed functions of the human brain.”).
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To be sure, many people have been predicting the imminent death
of Moore’s Law for a substantial period now,29 but it has neverthe-
less continued. Intel—a company that has a substantial interest in
accurately telling software makers what to expect—projects that
Moore’s Law will continue at least until 2029.30 Ray Kurzweil shows
that Moore’s Law is actually part of a more general exponential
computation growth that has been gaining force for over a 100
years.31 Integrated circuits replaced transistors that previously
replaced vacuum tubes that in their time had replaced electrome-
chanical methods of computation.32 Through all of these changes in
the mechanisms of computation, its power increased at an exponen-
tial rate.33 This perspective suggests that other methods under
research—from carbon nanotechnology to optical computing to
quantum computing—are likely to continue growing exponentially
even when silicon-based computing reaches its physical limits.34
Focusing on the exponential increase in hardware capability may
actually understate the acceleration in computational capacity in
two ways. First, a study considering developments in a computer
task using a benchmark for measuring computer speed over a
fifteen-year period suggests that the improvements in software
algorithms improved performance even more than the increase in
hardware capability.35 Second, computers are interconnected more
than ever before through the Internet, and these connections in-
crease collective capacity, not only because of the increasing density
among computer connections, but because of the increasing density
of connections among humans made possible by computers. 
29. See KURZWEIL, supra note 19, at 66 (noting observers’ beliefs that “Moore’s Law is
nothing more than self-fulfilling prophecy”).
30. Jeremy Geelan, Moore’s Law: “We See No End in Sight,” Says Intel’s Pat Gelsinger,
SOA WORLD MAG. (May 1, 2008, 2:30 PM), http://java.sys-con.com/read/557154.htm. 
31. KURZWEIL, supra note 19, at 66-67. 
32. See id.
33. Id. at 68.
34. For a good introduction to quantum computing, see GEORGE JOHNSON, A SHORTCUT
THROUGH TIME: THE PATH TO THE QUANTUM COMPUTER (2003). 
35. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: DESIGNING A DIGITAL FUTURE:
FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN NETWORKING AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 71 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/pcast-nitrd-report-2010.pdf.
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The salient feature of computers’ exponential growth is their
tremendous range of application compared to previous improve-
ments. Almost everything in the modern world can be improved by
adding an independent source of computational power. That is why
computational improvement has a far greater social effect than
improvements in technologies of old. Energy, medicine, and com-
munication are now being continually transformed by the increase
in computational power.36 As I will discuss in Part II, even the
formulation of new hypotheses in natural and social science will
likely be aided by computers in the near future.
The final perspective on accelerating technology is the experience
that the contemporary world provides. Technology changes the
whole tenor of life more rapidly than ever before. At the most basic
level, technological products change faster.37 Repeated visits to a
modern electronics store—or even a grocery store—reveal a whole
new line of products within very few years. In contrast, someone
visiting a store in 1910 and then again in 1920—let alone in 1810
and 1820—would not have noticed much difference. Even cultural
generations move faster. Facebook, for instance, has changed the
way college students relate in only a few years,38 whereas the tenor
of college life would not have seemed very different to students in
1920 and 1960. 
Our current subjective sense of accelerating technology is also
backed by more objective evidence from the contemporary world.
Accelerating amounts of information are being generated.39
Information, of course, is a proxy for knowledge. Consistent with
this general observation, we experience exponential growth in
practical technical knowledge, as evidenced by the rise in patent
36. See KURZWEIL, supra note 19, at 243-50 (energy); id. at 206-26 (biotechnology). 
37. Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, KURZWEIL ACCELERATING
INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 7, 2001), http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns. 
38. See generally Matthew Robert Vanden Boogart, Uncovering the Social Impacts of
Facebook on a College Campus (2006) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Kansas State University),
available at http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/bitstream/2097/181/4/MatthewVandenBoogart2006
.pdf (“Patents have become increasingly important .... [ ] and have adapted to remain abreast
of changing economic and scientific circumstances.”).
39. See Paula Skokowski, Data Tsunami—5 Exabytes of Data Created Every 2 Days?,
ACCELLION (Aug. 9, 2010, 5:08 PM), http://www.accellion.com/blog/2010/08/data-tsunami-5-
exabytes-of-data-created-every-2-days/.
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applications.40 Thus, the combination of data from our present life,
together with the more sweeping historical and technological
perspectives, makes a compelling case that technological accelera-
tion is occurring. 
It is this technological acceleration that creates both the capacity
and the need for improving collective decision making. As technol-
ogy accelerates, it creates new phenomena, from climate change to
biotechnology to artificial intelligence of a human-like capacity.
These technologies may themselves have very large positive or neg-
ative externalities and may require government decisions about
their prohibition, regulation, or subsidization to forestall harms and
capture their full benefits. They may also cause social dislocations,
from unemployment to terrorism, that also require certain collective
decisions. Society can best handle these crises not only by making
better social policy to address them directly but by improving social
policy more generally to create both more resources and more social
harmony to endure them. Thus, society must deploy information
technology in the service of democratic updating if it is to manage
technological acceleration. 
II. DEMOCRACY, POLICY CONSEQUENCES, AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE
If information helps in updating beliefs and in leading to conver-
gence on better policies, then a central object of public law should be
to empower the new information technologies, such as empiricism,
and dispersed media, which lower the costs of creating and access-
ing common social knowledge. Before describing the effects of some
of these specific technologies, it is useful to offer a brief theory of
how reducing information costs is likely to lead to a better and more
harmonious society. This framework explains why it is important to
move any society to its information frontier. 
Societies do best when they understand and act on the likely con-
sequences of their collective decisions. Lowering information costs
through the use of modern information technology can improve
collective decision making in three ways. First, it helps create more
40. See generally Michael McAleer & Daniel Slottje, A Simple New Measure of Innovation:
The Patent Success Ratio, 63 SCIENTOMETRICS 421, 421 (2005), available at http://www.
iemss.org/iemss2004/pdf/econometric/mcalasim.pdf.
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common social knowledge. Second, it encourages citizens to organize
around diffuse public interests. Third, it encourages citizens to vote
more on the basis of the public interest. 
A. Creating Social Knowledge
First, and most obviously, reducing the costs of creating and
accessing information creates more social knowledge about public
policy and makes more of that knowledge common. The growth of
common social knowledge itself can potentially help policymakers
make better decisions. A key assumption beyond this claim is that
some of the disagreements in a democracy are over factual conse-
quences of policies, not simply political values.
Completely defending this assumption would require a more de-
tailed discussion than possible here, but the dynamics of political
life seem to support it. President George W. Bush proclaimed that
tax cuts for individuals offered a way out of recession and would
increase economic growth.41 President Barack Obama proclaimed
that his stimulus plan of higher government spending offered a way
out of recession and would increase economic growth.42 These were
very different plans from Presidents of different parties, but the
proffered objectives were broadly similar. As to these issues of
growth, what is debated is which political program will, as a matter
of fact, broadly deliver these economic goods. 
Factual consequences matter even as to issues within the eco-
nomic debate in which there is disagreement, as for instance on
the issue of balance between growth and equality. Most favoring
equality will nevertheless want as much growth as is consistent
with an equality constraint, and most favoring growth will never-
theless want to minimize harm to equality. Thus more information
about methods of increasing economic growth will make it easier to
find the best way to increase economic growth without substantially
reducing social equality or the best way to reduce economic ine-
quality without substantially decreasing economic growth. 
41. See Remarks on the Bipartisan Congressional Tax Relief Agreement and an Exchange
with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 474 (May 1, 2001) (arguing that tax cuts would stimulate the
economy).
42. See Statement on Signing the American Recovery and Investment Act of 2009, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 109 (Feb. 17, 2009) (seeing the act as aid in economic growth).
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The current debate over education reform also centers on instru-
mental questions about the factual results of policy. Americans
overwhelming want publicly funded education to deliver quality
education to children. Of course, exactly how government aid is to
increase educational outputs is a matter of intense contemporary
disagreement. Will vouchers or charter schools improve attain-
ments? Even within government run schools, will merit pay or
smaller class sizes or both raise test scores? But these important
questions are ones of means, not ends. 
An important reason for substantial consensus on objectives
within a nation on such questions is geopolitical competition. For
instance, the rise of China prompts widespread concern about how
to make sure our children have the education to keep the nation’s
economy competitive. In part, Americans want continued economic
growth to assure that United States has the resources to continue
to occupy a position of geopolitical strength in its dealings with this
rising power.43
But even on the assumption that better knowledge of the actual
consequences of policy has the potential to resolve some political
disagreements, it will only do so if policymakers actually use this
improved knowledge as a basis for their decisions. They are more
likely to use the information for the public good in a democracy if
the public gives them incentives to do so. 
B. Encouraging Collective Action
Thus, a second effect of lowering information costs is important
as well. Modern information technology can reduce the information
costs citizens face in acting for common interests, like the best
methods for improving education and economic growth. Information
costs are one of the barriers to such collective action, because they
impede the capacity of individuals to organize with others of like
mind. When costs are high, groups in politics organize most effec-
tively around an interest from which they can receive a very
substantial payoff.44 Hence citizens can much more easily organize
43. See, e.g., David Barboza, Shanghai Schools Push Students to Top of Test, N.Y. TIMES
Dec. 30, 2010, at A4 (discussing concern that Chinese students are performing better than
Americans). 
44. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
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to engage in seeking particular rents from the government, as when
sugar growers find a common interest in subsidies.45
In our age, the cost of information about politics can fall suffi-
ciently so that citizens can more easily make common cause with
others on encompassing interests where the individual gain may be
relatively small but the gain to society is collectively large, such as
raising the economic growth rate or improving primary and second-
ary education. Moreover, once the policy instruments of achieving
a result, like better education, become more transparent, citizens
cannot be as easily misled by the pleading of a special interest
group, like a teachers union for a policy that helps the interest
group but not the public. Of course, special interest groups will
continue to lobby, but declining information costs about policy can
incrementally shift over time the balance of power between special
interests and groups focused on more encompassing interests in
society. 
C. Voting in the Public Interest
Lowering the costs of information also provides better incentives
to vote on the basis of encompassing interests rather than merely
parochial ones. Even on rational choice grounds, it has been shown
that voters consider broad issues of the common good, such as
whether a policy will help economic growth, as well as narrower
issues of whether the policy will help them in particular.46 But given
such dual motivations, voters are more likely to focus on parochial
interests insofar as it is unclear how encompassing interests
actually will be achieved. For instance, individuals have generally
had more reason to believe that a subsidy will benefit them than to
believe that a policy will lead to economic growth, because knowl-
edge regarding growth-enhancing policies has been sparse, uncer-
tain, and not very accessible to the ordinary citizen. But as the cost
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (explaining the influence of special interest groups in
democratic societies).
45. Cf. id. at 143. 
46. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE
THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE 19-53 (1993). Americans consider the effect of a policy on
the nation as a whole. See SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND
PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 31 (1991).
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of information dissemination decreases, the policy instruments of
collective good may become more widely known. More citizens can
then emphasize their public interest inclinations in the voting
booth, more confident that policies supported by candidates that
they favor will actually redound to the public interest. Thus,
creating more social knowledge itself has a variety of incentive
effects, helping citizens organize and vote for more encompassing
interests. 
III. TWO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING SOCIAL
KNOWLEDGE
In one respect, the nature of today’s technological advances
makes it easier for social governance to adapt to their transforma-
tions. At the heart of technological acceleration is growth in
computation—an information capacity. Thus, unlike technological
innovations of the past from the iron ploughshare to the water mill
to the steam engine, this dynamo of technological improvements 
also directly improves the capacity for the accumulation, analysis,
and distribution of information and thereby enhancing the capacity
for policy analysis.
Computational improvements, broadly understood, are making
available a variety of new information technologies that may
improve social governance, including predictions markets47 and
artificial intelligence.48 Here, however, we have space to focus in
detail on just two new information technologies, modern empiricism
and dispersed media, and the synergies they help create between
themselves and with other innovative technologies to improve social
governance. In Part IV, we consider the political reforms that can
best integrate these technologies into social governance. 
47. For the best discussion of prediction markets, see MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ,
PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISIONMAKING (2008).
48. See John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2010). 
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A. Modern Empiricism
1. The Nature of Empiricism 
Empirical social science attempts to discover the causes of social
behavior. One cause of social behavior is social policies. Insofar as
empirical investigators show how various policies affect social be-
havior, they create social knowledge that can improve policies on
the assumption that there is a consensus about whether the
behavior is to be encouraged or discouraged. 
Like natural science, social science seeks the causes of things,
but the nature of social phenomena makes this task difficult.
Experiments can be designed reliably to isolate the causes of
natural phenomena, but social science generally faces the difficulty
of trying to infer causes from a welter of real world data.49 For
instance, assume that Massachusetts places substantial restrictions
on ownership and carrying of guns and Idaho imposes very few
restrictions. Can one use this difference to evaluate the effects of
gun control on homicides? Even if Idaho has a substantially lower
homicide rate than Massachusetts, it does not follow from that
correlation that gun control is causing that difference. Some other
difference between Massachusetts and Idaho may be responsible for
this disparity—anything from differences in demography to differ-
ences in culture. Moreover, because of the legislative decisions made
in each state the observer can only see the effects of many restric-
tions in Massachusetts, not in Idaho, and the effect of few restric-
tions in Idaho and not in Massachusetts.
As a result, social science empiricism routinely faces difficulties,
particularly the problem of excluding the possibility that correla-
tions do not reflect causation. But social scientists have found clever
ways to control for this possibility by introducing other variables to
account for such possible causes as demography or culture.50 By
doing so, they thus reduce the likelihood that unobserved factors
provide explanations for correlations.51 To be sure, making analysis
49. See Steven I. Friedland, Law, Science and Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 387
(1998). 
50. See James Lindgren, Predicting the Future of Empirical Legal Studies, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1447, 1448-49 (2006).
51. See id. at 1448.
2011] LAWS FOR LEARNING 321
more complex may allow researchers to introduce ideologically
driven distortions, but as discussed below the culture of empiricism
has the potential to minimize this risk. 
In some cases, social science empiricists are able to closely
approximate scientific experiments.52 A natural experiment is an
experiment in which a scientist finds a real-world event that
changes the levels of a variable they want to measure. A natural
experiment depends on an event that is random with respect to the
factors that may prevent correlation from reflection causation.53
Only then can social scientists come close to replicating a scientific
experiment. For instance, Jonathan Klick and Alex Tabarrock used
the Homeland Security alerts as a natural experiment to demon-
strate the effectiveness of police.54 Homeland Security alerts in-
crease the number of police in a given area but are otherwise
random events with respect to crime rates.55 On the basis of this
information, their analysis suggests that a 50 percent increase in
the number of police reduces crime by approximately 15 percent.56
Part IV discusses how government policy can randomize two or
more different policies to create policy experiments.
To be sure, experiments will not routinely provide conclusive
proof regarding what policies to pursue. Social phenomena often
have complex interactions.57 Even if in Minneapolis it turns out that
pupils assigned to charter schools were better than those assigned
to public schools, this difference may be due to something about
charter schools in Minnesota that cannot be generalized throughout
the United States. Nevertheless, even if such interactions have an
effect, such an experiment has value because it will change our view
about what policy should be pursued locally and may even change
our estimate of how effective vouchers are likely to be elsewhere.
Knowledge is incremental, and it is no argument against random-
ization or decentralization to argue that it is not a single magic
52. See id.
53. See id. at 1448-49.
54. See Jonathan Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, Using Terror Alert Levels To Estimate the
Effect of Police on Crime, 48 J.L. & ECON. 267, 268 (2005).
55. See id. at 271. 
56. Id. 
57. See Jim Manzi, What Social Science Does—and Doesn’t—Know, CITY J., Summer 2010,
available at http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_3_social-science.html.
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bullet. Moreover, the fact that even randomization studies need to
be multiplied to gain more conclusive results is an argument for
greater systemization of randomization that only government can
encourage. 
It might be argued that empiricism does not have the potential to
help settle policy disputes because the causes empiricists infer are
not really facts, given that they are not directly observed. But much,
if not most, knowledge that affects how we live our lives is not
directly observed. Most of us do not directly observe that the earth
is round or that a molecule is made up of atoms but infer such
propositions from other facts or credit their truth on the basis of
scientific authority. Over time such scientific knowledge can have
large social effects. Knowledge about social behavior may be harder
to come by, but it remains knowledge even if it depends on infer-
ences and authority.
2. The Rise of Empiricism 
The accelerating power of computers, discussed above, addresses
what has always been the Achilles’ heel of social science empiricism:
its need for enormous amounts of data and huge calculating
capacity to tease apart causation from mere correlation. First, the
social world must be broken down into numbers that can be cal-
culated, and to deal with matters of any social complexity, a lot of
numbers are required. To draw any conclusions, these numbers then
must be sliced and diced to test hypotheses about particular social
claims, such as the assertion that a certain kind of charter school
improves test scores or that the deployment of more police decreases
crime. 
But now computers have ever greater storage capacity that allows
more and more facts to be collected, making possible more compre-
hensive measurements of world events.58 In fact, electronic agents
may soon sweep the web to collect data for researchers to use.59 The
ubiquity of networked sensors will also collect far more data.60 Such
58. See Lindgren, supra note 50, at 1454. 
59. See Stephen T. Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The Emerging Law of
Electronic Agents, 56 BUS. LAW. 341, 362 (2000) (noting the growth of autonomous agents on
the net). 
60. See Declan Butler, Everything, Everywhere, 440 NATURE 402, 402, 405 (2006). 
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data allow more opportunities for natural experiments. Storage of
masses of data also allows social scientists to evaluate more possible
causes of social phenomena and thus better approximate the true
causes of social problems and successes.61
Greater computer calculating power also permits the construction
of ever more complex equations, by which investigators try to ex-
clude the confounding factors always present in the messy social
world and thus to reveal the true causes of social phenomena.62 It
also permits the use of methods such as repeated sampling, which
produces better error estimates and gives researchers greater
confidence in their results.63 Finally, it provides the computational
infrastructure for ongoing advances in statistical methods.64
Given the continuing acceleration in information processing, we
can expect more computational assistance to obtain even more and
richer results. First, by 2020, computers are predicted to generate
hypotheses to be tested, and thus we will not have to depend on only
the ingenuity of researchers for testing the full range of expla-
nations for social phenomena.65 Second, computer simulations will
become more powerful, permitting researchers to see what happens
when they vary certain data from existence.66 Such simulations will
help enhance the robustness of empirical results. 
Perhaps most importantly, the declining cost of empiricism will
also change the culture of social science analysis by reducing the
relative costs of empiricism and theory. A hundred years ago, arm-
chair speculation was very cheap compared to empiricism, because
the cost of seriously doing the latter enterprise was high, generally
prohibitively so, in that the available technology rarely delivered
any useful results. Thus, it was rational for universities to hire
mostly theorists without much interest in comprehensive and sta-
tistical inquiry into the social world. But now that the cost of empir-
icism has fallen, a cascade of empiricists of all kinds—economists,
61. For discussion of the huge increase in storage capacity for data, see generally
Alexander Szalay & Jim Gray, Science in an Exponential World, 440 NATURE 413 (2006). 
62. See Jonathan Simon, Law After Society, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 143, 188 (1999).
63. See Derek Partridge, A Science of Approximate Computation, http://www.nesc.
ac.uk/esi/events/Grand_Challenges/paneld/d17.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
64. See Lindgren, supra note 50, at 1452.
65. See Stephen H. Muggleton, Exceeding Human Limits, 440 NATURE 409, 409 (2006). 
66. See JOSHUA M. EPSTEIN & ROBERT AXTELL, GROWING ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES: SOCIAL
SCIENCE FROM THE BOTTOM UP 19-20 (1996). 
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psychologists, political scientists—is flowing into our universities
and think tanks.67
In law in particular, the rise of empiricism has been the most
important change in legal scholarship in the last ten years.68 Cornell
Law School has created a new peer-reviewed journal devoted to
empiricism.69 A conference wholly devoted to empiricism and law is
held every year.70 In 2009, 175 papers were presented, approxi-
mately 50 percent more than the previous year.71
The large number of empiricists can create a rich market for
empirical work and provide greater incentives to get the facts and
models absolutely correct. For instance, the norms of empirical
research are now beginning to require disclosure of data so that
other investigators cannot only replicate the results but also subject
the data to their own investigations that can test the robustness of
the conclusions with additional statistical analysis.72 Consideration
is being given to whether evidence-based systemic review should
supplement peer review. Thus, empirical culture will be no less
ubiquitous than computing itself and it can serve to reorient our
political culture over time to a greater concern with consequences.73 
Better empiricism more broadly disseminated should mean that
social scientists should converge on similar results. To be sure, there
will be disagreements, but the rewards of a culture of empiricism
should make empiricists handle these disputes in a professional
way, adjudicating them with reference to the best evidence and
67. On the rise of empiricists in law schools, see Henry G. Manne & Joshua D. Wright,
The Future of Law and Economics: A Discussion 2-3 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-35, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1145421.
68. See generally Marc C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism:
Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555 (2010).
69. See Journal of Empirical Legal Studies—Journal Information, WILEY.COM, http://
www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp? ref=1740-1453&site=1 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
On the importance of peer review for improving empirical scholarship, see Gregory Mitchell,
Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 175 (2004).
70. See The Fourth Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, USC LAW (Nov. 20-21,
2009), http://lawweb.usc.edu/assets/docs/contribute/CELSPorgram_002_.pdf.
71. For the 2009 program, see id. For the 2008 program, see Conference on Empirical/
Legal Studies 2008, CELS 2008 (Sept. 12-13, 2008), http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/
cels2008/schedule.cfm.
72. See Lindgren, supra note 50, at 1454; Mitchell, supra note 69, at 190-94. 
73. See infra Part IV.
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methodology.74 As in other sciences, adherence to professional norms
will determine advancement and prestige.
To be clear, for the most part empirical studies will not directly
change the minds of citizens. People are not statisticians and have
better things to do with their time. But experts themselves affect
policy. Indeed, representatives and experts have such a large com-
bined effect on policy that some conceptions of democracy under-
stand competition between elites (both representatives and experts)
as the essence of modern democracy.75
Moreover, empirical work is now discussed in our dispersed media
like blogs. The blogs are the most dynamic and consequential part
of our media culture because of their own influence and the influ-
ence they exert through more mainstream media. By sifting and
critiquing empirical work, dispersed media can amplify the most
powerful empirical work, generating a better ratio of signals to noise
from the professional enterprise of social fact finding. Given such
synergies, we now turn to an analysis of the potential of dispersed
media in modern democracy.
B. Dispersed and Innovative Media
New innovative media, such as blogs and web videos, advance a
politics of learning. The most beneficial effect of the web on democ-
racy is its capacity to produce better evaluation of policy conse-
quences. Because of the greater space and interconnections that the
web makes available, web-based media can be dispersed and
specialized, and yet interconnected and connected with the wider
world—a powerful combination to create better assessments of
policy through debate and disagreement. As a result of this more
decentralized and competitive media, the web generates both more
innovative policy ideas and better assessments of policy than in the
days when mainstream media dominated the flow of political
discussion. However, the more mainstream media does remain an
74. See Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist’s Perspective, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1999). 
75. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 18 (arguing for a concept
of democracy where elites chosen by the people rule, as opposed to a more deliberate
democracy in which the citizens themselves make the decisions).
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important part of the mix, sifting the best of the web and bringing
it to a wider public. 
Blogs can be specialized and address issues with a level of so-
phistication that major media cannot sustain.76 Just in the area of
law, there are now scores of widely read blogs—often with quite
particular focuses.77 New websites, like Calculated Risk and Mish’s
Global Economic Trend Analyses, offer their own analyses of global
economic news.78
Such specialized media improves factual knowledge of the policy
world in two respects. First, specialized media provides a frame-
work and discipline for the information in a particular area.79
Unlike the mass media of the past, which emphasized theatrical
opposition between partisan opponents in order to attract readers,
some new specialized media will not seek out shrill or extreme
voices.80 Moreover, experts participating in such media and ad-
dressing their peers could speak more cautiously and with less
partisanship in the media arena. For instance, the Empirical Legal
Studies blog helps enforce professional standards by drawing more
prominent attention to good and bad examples of legal empiricism.81
In the world of intense scrutiny that specialized media creates,
scholars will suffer blows to their reputation if they fail to engage in
careful self-monitoring about their public policy pronouncements.
Thus, specialization has the potential to match interest in truth
seeking with an individual interest in personal advancement—an
interest that is already reflected in the discussion in the world of
76. See Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONST. COMMENT.
481, 511 (1997).
77. For a list of the huge number of specialized law professors’ blogs, see LEGAL BLOGS,
http://law-library.rutgers.edu/resources/lawblogs.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
78. See Stephen Mihim, D.I.Y. Macroeconomics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/19/magazine/ideas210.html. 
79. See Bennett, supra note 76, at 511 (discussing the importance of specialized media in
ventilating particular policy disputes). 
80. In economics alone, there are more than two dozen respected blogs that range from
left to right. See Top 25 Economic Blogs, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124768581740247061.html. In law as well, there is a wide variety of blogs that specialize
in particular topics and range widely over the ideological spectrum. See Paul L. Caron, 2009
Law Prof Blog Rankings, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 20, 2010), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_
blog/2010/01/2009-law-prof.html (listing top blogs by law professors).
81. See EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/ (last
visited Oct. 31, 2011).
2011] LAWS FOR LEARNING 327
natural science. As Philip Tetlock has said, “[T]he more people know
about pundits’ track records, the stronger the pundits’ incentives to
compete by improving the epistemic (truth) value of their pro-
ducts.”82
Second, such specialized media feeds into larger, more main-
stream media, providing the kernels for stories that reach the wider
public.83 A modern reporter’s beat is not simply pounding the
pavement but going online.84 Indeed, the Internet has become a vast
funnel of information that allows specialized but important infor-
mation to be diffused into the wider world in a form in which it can
be understood.85 Hypertext makes this fact visible: the reporter
links to the academic article on which he relies, just as the academic
may link to the data set on which she relies. The funnel has a two-
way flow as well: such dispersed medias also monitor more main-
stream medias, creating another kind of constraint that makes the
information flow more accurate.86
Thus, the dispersed media creates a better discovery function for
deciding what issues should be on the polity’s agenda. No longer do
we rely on the relatively unguided judgment of journalists. Instead,
we have a direct pipeline from experts. The heightened degree of
sifting helps the media patrol more efficiently for the issues most
important to the flourishing of the polity.87
82. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGEMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT, HOW CAN WE
KNOW? 23 (2005).  
83. See GLEN N. REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS: HOW MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY
EMPOWER ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BEAT BIG MEDIA, BIG GOVERNMENT, AND OTHER GOLIATHS 89-
97 (2006).
84. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Future of the Press in a Time of Managed News, 2 FLA.
INT’L U. L. REV. 41, 51 (2007).
85. Newspapers themselves now have reporters who focus on bringing academic empirical
research to the attention of their readers. For an example of the funnel at work, see David
Brooks, The Biggest Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A24 (discussing various empirical
studies on what will improve learning capacity in small children). 
86. REYNOLDS, supra note 83, at 125-33. The dispersed media revolution is continuing.
Video in the form of YouTube and other clips has only recently begun and yet already has an
effect on political campaigns. See Jody C. Baumgartner & Jonathan S. Morris, My FaceTube
Politics, 28 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 24, 31 (2010); Vassia Gueorguieva, Voters, MySpace, and
YouTube: The Impact of Alternative Communication Channels on the 2006 Election Cycle and
Beyond, 26 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 288 (2007). Social networks are also a potential avenue
for conveying relevant information, as they permit groups of individuals to easily collaborate
on policy initiatives. 
87. POPKIN, supra note 46, at 47.
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More generally, the funnel helps perform two crucial functions in
structuring knowledge for social use. First, it helps with a concern
that goes back to Aristotle: how one elicits the technical knowledge
that experts have and keeps it available as social knowledge that
can facilitate social decision making. The new media funnel makes
available the technical knowledge that social scientists and other
empiricists have developed.
Second, by making this knowledge available to the broader public,
new media makes this knowledge more common. Common knowl-
edge plays an important role in social decision making because it
creates, in economic terms, a positive economic spillover. When
many minds possess similar knowledge, it becomes possible to
create even more ideas through recombination. The point has been
made in the context of technological innovation.88 But the same
point can be made in terms of political innovation; there can be
more improvement in policy ideas once they are more broadly
known, as some ideas are discarded and others are recombined to
yield yet different approaches. 
The mechanisms for updating are undoubtedly less rapid and
unerring in the democratic setting than in that of the market for
technology, because the incentives are less powerful. In technologi-
cal innovation, inventors and entrepreneurs have profit incentives
to discard false propositions and recombine ideas for more pro-
ductive innovations. Nevertheless, even in the democratic process,
experts have incentives to update because of the effects on their
reputations, and politicians have incentives to update because of the
effects on election outcomes. Because these incentives are less direct
and less powerful than monetary ones, updating will take longer
and be more imperfect. Nevertheless the intensity of exchange and
confrontation afforded by new media have the potential to speed the
process along, particularly in conjunction with the rise of empiricism
and prediction markets.
The ongoing switch from television to more dispersed media has
good effects on the nature of common knowledge. Television empha-
sizes the personal, encouraging people to make more-than-war-
ranted extrapolations from personal characteristics of a candidate
88. See JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 32. 
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to the improvements he will make to public policy.89 But the new
dispersed media encourages a more policy-oriented evaluation of the
candidates’ positions on the issues. 
Some have expressed concerns that the Internet and other new
media actually represent a danger to democracy because they will
lead to more polarization. Cass Sunstein is the most prominent of
these theorists.90 His argument that the new media may undermine
democratic deliberation combines a theory about the Internet with
one about human psychology.91 He argues that the Internet moves
us toward more perfect filtering of worldviews because technology
allows people to live in an information bubble where all the in-
formation reinforces their beliefs.92 Conservatives visit only right-
leaning sites, and liberals visit only left-leaning sites.93 He also
relies on experiments in psychology that suggest that individuals
embrace more extreme views when they associate with others with
extreme views and are exposed to more of the arguments on one
side.94
Both steps of Sunstein’s argument are open to challenge. First, as
Dan Hunter has suggested, perfect filtering of other views is really
not possible, because systems cannot be perfect filters.95 Moreover,
the evidence as yet does not suggest any better filtering afforded by
the Internet has given people a more monochromatic view of the
world.96 For instance, a recent study has suggested that ideological
segregation on the Internet is not a strong effect.97 Conservatives
get a diet of online information that is the ideological equivalent of
reading USA Today and liberals the equivalent of listening to
CNN.98 An individual’s online community is actually less ideologi-
89. Cf. POPKIN, supra note 46, at 91 (“Television ... provides the ‘illusion of intimacy.’”
(citation omitted)). 
90. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 69 (2007). 
91. See id. at 5-7.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 50.
94. Id. at 61.
95. Dan Hunter, Philipic.com, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 614 (2002) (reviewing CASS
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001)).
96. Id. at 651.
97. See Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Ideological Segregation Online and
Offline 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15916, 2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15916.
98. See id. 
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cally segregated than his or her neighborhood or network of friends,
suggesting that the Internet may expose people to more diverse
views than people would.99
Nor does the Internet provide the same context as the experi-
ments on polarization on which Sunstein relies. For instance, the
experiments Sunstein cites happened over a short time period, at
most a few days.100 Internet exposure is over a long period. People’s
uptake on the Internet is enduring. As has been noted, this dif-
ference makes the experiments on which Sunstein relies relatively
weak support for his extrapolation about the effect of the Internet
on ideological extremes in the real world because citizens’ under-
standing of the world comes not only from their choices on the
Internet but also from their daily life and events they cannot
control.101 In fact, those who are online regularly are more tolerant
of ideas they do not like than those who are not.102
Finally, Sunstein’s view is a static one, because it ignores the way
that new information technologies, including dispersed media, will
create a politics oriented to facts. For instance, empirical studies of
past policies place greater emphasis on whether policies actually
work. Prediction markets could make the debate about what future
policies will actually do far more politically salient. 
The very structure of the Internet’s capacity for interconnection
also makes following trails of evidence easier. Because hyperlinking
to sources is low cost, it becomes the norm to do so. More generally,
when one side makes factual claims crucial to its argument, the
other side has incentives to show that they are not true. More than
ever, the Internet allows such claims to be investigated and
analyzed. Hyperlinks provide an easy way to ground one’s own
argument in facts and point out the errors of others. 
An example can help make this abstract point more concrete.
Robert Barro, a Harvard economics professor who is frequently
mentioned as a candidate for the Nobel Prize, recently published an
op-ed in the Wall Street Journal arguing that extending the
99. See Gentzkow & Shapiro, supra note 97, at 2.
100. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 90, at 70.
101. See Hunter, supra note 95, at 651.
102. Jeffrey R. Young, A Study Finds that Web Users Are More Tolerant than Non-Users,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 15, 2001, http://chronicle.com/article/A-Study-Finds-that-Web-
Users/109088.
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unemployment benefits during the 2008-2009 recession had sub-
stantially increased the unemployment rate.103 Bloggers were unde-
terred by his prestige or authority and raised substantial doubts
about the factual underpinning of his argument. A key premise of
Barro’s argument was that it is possible to extrapolate what the
employment numbers today should be from what employment was
in previous recessions.104 But commentators pointed out that the
recent recession was very different due to huge losses stemming
from a housing bubble.105 These losses in turn depressed new
housing starts, which had themselves been good predictors of the
unemployment rate.106 Another commentator provided evidence that
Barro had gotten the relationship between unemployment insurance
and unemployment backwards.107 It was high unemployment that
caused insurance to be lengthened, rather than the other way
around.108
Some wax nostalgic for a time when a relatively few established
sources—the major networks and major newspapers—set the agen-
da for social policy through their decisions about what to report.109
But just as more vigorous market competition improves consumer
welfare through creating better products, more vigorous competition
in ideas should improve policy, particularly when the medium
creates a trail to the factual grounding of arguments. 
The information advantages of dispersed media over more con-
centrated media are similar to those of democracy over oligarchy.
Other forms of government appear much more stable than dem-
ocracy, because they create less surface conflict. But the absence
of conflict makes it harder to find changing consensus on policies
that will work. Media oligopoly is not dictatorship, but the relative
absence of factual confrontation projects a pretense of social know-
103. Robert Barro, Op-Ed., The Folly of Subsidizing Unemployment, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30,
2010, at A15.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Joe Weisenthal, Does Anyone Believe that Unemployment Would Be Just 6.8%
if Obama Hadn’t Extended Jobless Benefits?, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 30, 2010, 7:57 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/robert-barro-on-extending-jobless-benefits-2010-8.
106. Id. (“Housing is just one difference, but ... it’s a powerful predictor of jobs.”).
107. See E. Tedeschi, Robert Barro Picks a Hard Fight, LOBSTER STUFFED WITH TACOS
(Aug. 31, 2010, 12:25 AM), http://etedeschi.com/2010/08/31/robert-barro-picks-a-hard-fight/.
108. Id.
109. See ALAN WOLFE, DOES AMERICAN DEMOCRACY STILL WORK? 109-11 (2006).
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ledge that is not necessarily well-founded. In contrast, dispersed
media forces confrontations about the factual disagreements
underlying policy disputes—a process that is more likely to root out
falsehoods and in the long run to generate actual knowledge.
C. A Culture of Social Learning 
New information technologies have the potential to create a new
democratic culture of learning, focusing on the consequences of
policies. They create synergies, providing improvements that are
more than the sum of their parts. Empiricism gathers information
about the past that helps prediction markets test the future.110 The
dispersed media brings to the fore issues that should be on the
political agenda for testing and predicting. Dispersed media also
offers theories about social events that can be tested. If facts
without theory are blind and theory without facts is inert, the
combination of empiricism and dispersed media helps generate the
needed synthesis. 
The notion that information about the actual consequences of
policy is necessarily part of democratic ordering is not itself new.
The political scientist Charles Lindblom viewed informal experi-
mentation as the essence of democratic practice: democratic policy
is “a piecemeal process of limited comparisons, a sequence of trials
and errors followed by revised trials.”111 The difference today is that
better information technologies permits more rapid and accurate
assessments of policy successes and failures even as accelerating
technology makes mistates more costly. 
It should be emphasized that the changes these new technologies
will make to democracy will be gradual. Neverthelesss over time
they have the potential to make a large difference to political cul-
ture, assuming our political system creates rules to maximize their
impact. Indeed, as these sources of information become more prev-
alent in daily life, we might expect some people to embrace this
culture as part of their identity, focusing on the latest predictions
from information markets and empirical studies and leaving behind
110. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 16.
111. See Charles Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 88
(1959). 
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more partisan or ideological worldviews as central to their sense of
self.
Some might regard the kind of democratic decision making that
empirical studies, and factually based dispersed media promote as
impoverished. This kind of democracy focuses on instrumental
questions such as what will create economic growth, improve health
care outcomes, or decrease certain pollutants. It is of far less help in
deciding more cosmic questions, such as whether economic growth
is a good thing, or moral questions, such as whether abortion should
be legal. But there is little evidence that the public at large is
preoccupied with such large cosmic questions, and although many
people are intensely interested in social and moral questions like
abortion, democratic discussion does not often promote consensus or
resolution. Thus, while nothing about factual updating in a demo-
cracy suggests that these kinds of issues should ever be outside the
bounds of democratic discourse, it is defensible to focus on promot-
ing the better resolution of the more tractable issues in which most
people are interested. 
The focus on a politics of factual updating can be seen as part of
Western political philosophy’s long tradition of trying to reduce the
social salience of issues, like religious questions, that have no clear
answer and focus on issues on which there can be progress, such as
the creation of wealth and the prolongation of life.112 Of course, for
much of the last few centuries, the progress on such tractable issues
has derived from the natural sciences, not the empirical social
sciences.113 Today, however, our structure of governance must create
rules to elicit answers from the social sciences on disputed issues of
social policy as well, because technology has simultaneously em-
powered the empiricism at the heart of useful social science and
created the kind of accelerated change that only a more empirically
minded democracy can address.
Many of the mechanisms that help democracy perform better are
not themselves democratic in the sense of weighing the opinions of
all citizens equally. As long as democracy permits these mechanisms
to enrich the information its citizens utilize when they vote, there
112. See Witte, supra note 7, at 495 (noting that enlightenment ideas suggest that “society
achieve a properly focused and properly restricted political process").
113. See Mitchell, supra note 69, at 30.
334 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:305
is no contradiction between these mechanisms and democratic
decision making. Each citizen’s preferences should count equally in
a democracy, but democracy, like any other institution, will work
best if its decisions rest on accurate factual readings of the world.114
As Senator Patrick Moynihan once famously said, a person has a
right to his own opinions, “but not to his own facts.”115 The next
Section turns to rules that help democracy capture the dispersed
information latent in the world and focus it to permit greater
agreement on the consequences of policy. 
IV. LEGAL REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC UPDATING
This Part discusses important reforms that would make for more
effective learning about sound social policies. Each of the newly
powerful mechanisms of information—empiricism, randomization,
and new media—need legal regimes to make them most effective. 
A. Empiricism and Information-Eliciting Rules
Just as empiricists become more valuable in an empirical age, so
do structures of government that elicit information for empirical
study. Government programs that actually put policies to an em-
pirical test also become more desirable because we have better
mechanisms to conduct testing. Besides the instrumental advan-
tages of information-eliciting rules, they also create a better political
culture. If political culture focuses on actual policy results, politi-
cians cannot as easily posture by exaggerating the benefits of their
policies and ignoring their costs. Moreover, as information-eliciting
rules create more testing, citizens will become even more insistent
that policies be tested to assure their value. 
The empirical age makes three kind of information-eliciting rules
more valuable. The first two track the two kinds of empiricism
discussed above. The first category of rules encourage decentraliza-
tion. By permitting jurisdictions to adapt different policies, a polit-
ical system creates information about the effects of different policies
114. See POPKIN, supra note 46, at 96-97. 
115. Steven R. Weisman, Introduction to DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN: A PORTRAIT IN
LETTERS OF AN AMERICAN VISIONARY 1, 2 (Steven R. Weisman ed., 2010).
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that can then be tested through regression analysis and similar
methods. The second category is randomization. By randomizing the
application of different policies, governments can actually create
experiments—called field experiments—yielding data to assess
policy. 
The third category is the simplest—rules that make government
data more available in the most transparent and useful form. Such
rules advance empiricism by offering more material for testing and
assessment. The display of data also makes government more
transparent, providing relative empowerment to those who want
to organize on behalf of encompassing interests like improving
education.
Each branch of government has a role to play in creating infor-
mation-eliciting rules. Congress can systematically require that
legislation consider the virtues of decentralization and randomiza-
tion, can require that government data be made available, and can
provide funding for empirical studies. The President can require
agencies to engage in experiments within the discretion that
Congress permits and prevent them from squelching different
approaches at the state level. The judiciary can adopt a jurispru-
dence fostering social discovery, creating constitutional space for
federalism and thus decentralization. 
To some degree, this movement toward creating more space for
experimentation is already taking place, if only inchoately and in-
termittently. By reviving constitutional federalism,116 the Supreme
Court has moved, however fitfully and incrementally, to create more
effective social discovery machines within society, thereby making
possible  more evaluation of different approaches to social policy.
In educational initiatives, like the No Child Left Behind Act,117
Congress has encouraged public schools to evaluate the success of
their programs based on scientific evidence.118 In the related
116. See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 511-13 (2002).
117. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C.).
118. The No Child Left Behind Act mentions scientific evidence more than a hundred
times. See Herbert Turner et al., Populating an International Web-Based Randomized Trials
Register in the Social, Behavioral, Criminological, and Education Sciences, 589 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 203, 205 (2003).
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Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002,119 Congress created a fed-
eral agency to produce data about and analysis of programs to
improve educational outcomes120 and specifically called for random-
ized trials to test educational programs.121 But this Section provides
a rationale for systematically extending information eliciting rules
throughout the judicial, legislative, and regulatory functions of
government as well as creating specific institutions to enforce these
rules. 
1. Decentralization 
Of all the American governmental structures facilitating empiri-
cism, the oldest is federalism and the decentralization that it em-
bodies.122 A powerful investigative tool in social science is to
compare how different laws work in different jurisdictions, whether
states or nations.123 Such careful comparisons can help make
manifest the consequences of good and bad policies.124 To be sure, for
reasons discussed earlier, such comparisons face more problems in
establishing causation than randomized experiments, but random-
ization is not always politically possible or desirable. But an inves-
tigation of the effects of differences can work only if policies are
permitted to differ among jurisdictions.
Of course, the decision about the proper amount of decentraliza-
tion depends on considerations beyond the elicitation of information.
Federalism has other advantages: decentralization creates a market
119. Pub. L. No. 107-279, 116 Stat. 1940 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
120. See Turner et al., supra note 118, at 206. 
121. See Benjamin Michael Superfine, New Directions in School Funding and Governance:
Moving from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY. L.J. 653, 687-88 (2009).
122. Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633
(1993) (calling debates about federalism the oldest in constitutional law). Federalism is only
the beginning of decentralization. States then need to cede substantial authority to localities
in cases in which public goods are best produced locally. 
123. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors,
or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 455-56
(1996) (arguing against federal regulation of ethics because empirical tests of best practices
will thrive through permitting diversity). 
124. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85,
129 (2007) (arguing against premature harmonization of patent systems to gain data about
what works). 
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for governance by allowing different jurisdictions to compete to
attract people and investment.125 It also permits the formulation of
diverse policies that meet the diverse preferences of people. But
federalism can have costs as well. When one jurisdiction is able to
impose harms on another—what economists call negative exter-
nalities—a more centralized government spanning the different
jurisdictions has the capacity to address the externalities better
than multiple jurisdictions.126
Thus, the optimal degree of centralization of government policy
remains a judgment call, depending on the substantiality of the ex-
ternalities that more centralization could address and the quantum
of competition and satisfaction of diverse preferences that decen-
tralization can permit. But the possibility of sustained empiricism
adds an important weight on the decentralization side of the scale:
decentralization facilitates the empirical investigation of the dif-
fering consequences of social policy. Thus, far from being a relic
of the past, federalism’s virtues are reinforced by modern tech-
nology, because our computer age makes federalism a more effec-
tive discovery machine. With the rise of empiricism, Justice Louis
Brandeis’s praise of states as “laboratories of democracy” becomes
more than a metaphor.127
Given that there is little left of constitutional restraints on federal
power in the field of economic regulation, the political branches
must create space for decentralized experiments. In her paper in
this symposium, Gillian Metzger discusses how this movement is
happening in the Obama administration.128 For instance, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)129 offers states
substantial opportunities to experiment, albeit within a federal
framework.130 President Obama recently suggested, in fact, that he
would like to expand these opportunities by stating that he believed
125. See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 147 (1992).
126. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle:
The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23,
25 (1996).
127. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
128. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567 (2011).
129. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 25, 26,
29, and 42 U.S.C.).
130. See Obama Gives a Bit on Health Rules, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A7. 
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the law should be revised to allow the states immediately to design
their own plans so long as they meet the federal requirements for
expanding coverage.131 These comments suggest a federal frame-
work for state experimentation. President Obama and those sup-
porting his health initiative believe that the coverage decision
creates an interstate externality, because those without coverage
impose costs on everyone through use of health services paid by
taxpayers nationwide. But in every other aspect of heath care, the
benefits of experimentations are to be encouraged. Thus, states
should be free to experiment with a single-payer system, and other
states can try to refine a fee-for-service system. The point of this
example is not to defend the PPACA as an optimal reform but to
observe that even within the most important federal initiative for
decades there exists a consensus in favor of a great deal of experi-
mentation.
While this kind of division of authority between the federal and
state governments does not recreate constitutional federalism, such
federal statutory frameworks may provide a second-best kind of
information-eliciting rule in a world where constitutional federalism
has eroded. The federal government determines that certain object-
ives should be national because of the interstate externalities
involved. The best method of achieving those objectives is then left
to state experimentation.132
Congress also created another mechanism of experimentation in
authorizing the Race to the Top program, in which states may apply
for funds for innovative educational changes.133 The Education
Department decides which programs are best, providing the chosen
states with substantial funds to reorganize their educational pro-
grams.134 Results of the different initiatives are then carefully
assessed. 
Congress should institutionalize a concern with the experimen-
tation that comes from federalism by requiring that its committees
formally consider the informational advantages of leaving states
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 128, at 579.
133. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf (discussing
criteria for grant awards).
134. Id.
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free to legislate before it preempts the states. Even if a federal role
is desired, these requirements would further mandate considering
the benefits of leaving room for state experimentation within a fed-
eral policy framework.135 Even in the absence of action by Congress,
the President also has a role to play in expanding empirically
oriented federalism. Currently, through its regulatory apparatus,
the executive branch agencies routinely make decisions about pre-
empting state laws in favor of a federal standard.136 Such preemp-
tion suppresses differences in states’ regulation and thus decreases
the opportunity for empirical study of the effects of those policy
differences. The President should make clear that preemption is less
apt, other things being equal, when the empirical study of laws in
different jurisdictions is likely to provide substantial help in
deciding what is the best policy. Moreover, various agencies have
substantial authority to waive the federal requirements that
Congress imposes.137 The President should order agencies to sys-
tematically consider the advantages of experimental learning that
will accrue from granting waivers. 
 The Supreme Court also has a role to play in pursuing a juris-
prudence of social discovery by itself promoting information-eliciting
rules. Information elicitation provides a pragmatic justification for
revival of constitutional federalism in the area of noneconomic
policy,138 because in that area there tends not to be substantial
interstate externalities. As a result of this jurisprudence, different
states can adopt different policies on social issues, such as whether
guns can be carried near schools. Empiricists can compare these
policies to determine which kind of policy actually makes children
safer.139
135. So far, bills requiring committees to make federalism assessments have been
introduced in Congress without success. See, e.g., Federalism Accountability Act of 1999, S.
1214, 106th Cong. (1999).
136. Under the Bush administration, agencies were aggressive about preemption of state
law. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 227 (2007).
137. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health Law Waivers Draw Kudos, and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/health/policy/2-health.html.
138. See McGinnis, supra note 116, at 511-16. Since my 2002 article, the Court has seemed
to backslide from this revival in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005), in which the Court
permitted the federal government to regulate the personal medical use of marijuana, despite
a state law that permitted such use. 
139. There is now vigorous empirical research that has not yet attained consensus about
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The Supreme Court can also promote information-eliciting rules
by constraining its jurisprudence of substantive due process,
including that component that interprets the Bill of Rights to apply
to states with the same vigor with which it applies to the federal
government.140 As Justice Stevens reminded us, there are reasons
not to apply the Bill of Rights identically against the federal gov-
ernment and the states.141 Although the Court has not offered the
promotion of empiricism as a rationale for restraint in applying the
Bill of Rights, this rationale has, in fact, grown more powerful as the
apparatus for empiricism has grown more powerful.142 It has become
less plausible for the Court to rely on the Justices’ intuitions about
what the effect of providing a particular version of a right will be in
an age in which we can begin to test the effects of competing con-
ceptions. This preference for providing space for different versions
of rights that can be empirically tested rather than relying on
judicial fiat parallels the rise of empiricists over theorists in the
academic community. 
For instance, in the most important education case since Brown
v. Board of Education,143 the Court upheld school vouchers against
an Establishment Clause challenge, so long as the vouchers were
available for nonreligious as well as religious schools.144 This
holding permits the practical evaluation of whether such vouchers
lead to religious divisions as well as whether vouchers will improve
performance in the United States education system, which has
been widely criticized.145 Thus, this decision is potentially doubly
information-eliciting. Moreover, assuming that vouchers do improve
performance, schools will produce citizens who are better able to
the relation of gun control and crime generally. See Jens Ludwig, Gun Self-Defense and
Deterrence, 27 CRIME & JUST. 363, 367 (2000). 
140. See Peter Linzer, Why Bother with State Bills of Rights?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1573, 1605
(1990). 
141. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3109 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
142. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988) (identifying importance of experimen-
tation for future federalism). 
143. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002). 
145. This decision has already permitted much empirical research on whether vouchers
improve school performance. For a description of the research that has been largely favorable
to school vouchers, see Patrick J. Wolf, School Voucher Programs: What the Research Says
About Parental School Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 415. 
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process information and make better decisions, thus making society
as a whole a better social discovery machine.
While liberals frequently resort to the Establishment Clause to
trump state laws, the same analysis should apply to federal rights
to which conservatives appeal. The Court has held that the right to
keep and bear arms applies to the states.146 But the Court should
not apply this right with same vigor against the states as it does
against the federal government. Greater scope for experimentation
with gun control will allow better evaluation of the appropriate
scope of gun rights. 
A jurisprudence favoring social discovery through experimenta-
tion also calls for caution in expanding fundamental rights nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution. For instance, now that some
jurisdictions have granted same-sex marriage rights,147 the argu-
ment for the Supreme Court to stay its hand on mandating a
national right becomes stronger.148 Social scientists will be able to
study the actual effects of same-sex marriage and will have an
easier time doing so, because they will be able to compare the
jurisdictions recognizing same-sex marriage to those that refuse
recognition. Social scientists can then investigate claims of propo-
nents that same-sex marriage will help stabilize same-sex relation-
ships149 and claims of opponents that same-sex marriage will mean
that couples generally will take marriage obligations less seri-
ously.150 Of course, it is true that many people on both sides of the
debate will not care about these results, because they believe either
that same-sex marriage is a human right or a human or religious
evil, and thus its consequences do not matter. But many people in
the middle do not share such deontological absolutism. Proponents
and opponents of same-sex marriage recognize this fact: that is why
they make arguments based on consequences.
146. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046.
147. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
148. The case against a federal constitutional amendment defining marriage as the union
between a man and a woman can also rest on the need for experimentation in the area. See
John O. McGinnis & Nelson Lund, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1613 (2004). 
149. See, e.g., ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
HOMOSEXUALITY 181-85 (1995).
150. See Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social
Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 53 (2004). 
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Thus, all three branches of the federal government should con-
sider creating better frameworks for decentralization, ones in which
such devolution promotes experimentation and assessment. It
should also be remembered that federalism is a particular instance
of a more general social policy—decentralization—that favors
experimentation. Just as federal political actors should give space
for state experimentation, state political actors should devolve
responsibilities to localities when localities are better positioned to
test different policies. Localities in turn also should consider the
possibilities of experimentation in the policy structures they create.
For instance, because charter schools enjoy greater independence to
set educational policy, they create more opportunities to test what
ideas work. An age that provides the tools for serious empiricism
should make use of political structures that facilitate it. 
2. Randomizing Policy 
As discussed above, another way for empirical social science to
assess the effects of social policy is to use experiments that take
advantage of a random event that permits the direct measurement
of policy effects, such as increasing the number of police in an
area.151 The government itself can also create such field experiments
through policy, thereby facilitating social learning. The most obvi-
ous way it can do so is through randomization, assigning different
individuals or groups of individuals—perhaps based on geographic
districts—to different programs at random. Social scientists can
then measure the different outcomes. The idea here has parallels in
trials of a new medication. In order to ascertain whether a new drug
is efficacious, a randomized trial is devised whereby one group of
patients is given a new drug and another is given a placebo or an old
drug. The difference in outcomes can be measured and attributed to
the difference in treatments. 
Private businesses have been creating natural experiments to
make decisions on an ever broader scale.152 For instance, Google
decided what color its links should be by experimenting with
151. See supra notes 54-56.
152. See Thomas H. Davenport, How To Design Smart Business Experiments, HARV. BUS.
REV., Feb. 2009, at 69, 71. 
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different colors.153 Government should follow the lead of private
enterprise in creating frameworks for experimentation.
It is true that the government has already engaged in some
random social experiments. But these experiments have mostly cen-
tered on “persons or families who are somehow disadvantaged.”154
For instance, a wide variety of studies have randomly assigned re-
cipients of government benefits to different treatments, permitting
focus on how differences in job training or counseling in government
programs affect employment.155 There is room for similar experi-
ments when the conditions required of recipients are still subject to
debate.156 The extent to which prolonging of unemployment benefits
results in longer unemployment is still controversial and could be
assessed through social experiments.157
Sadly, however, the government has almost never conducted
studies directed at testing policies affecting middle- or upper-class
individuals, corporations, or the structure of government itself.
Broader policy studies affecting individuals could include testing the
effect of electricity charges that vary with time, or testing the effect
of differing health insurance deductibles on medical usage and out-
comes.158 An educational program, like school vouchers, can affect
individuals of varying income levels. It is one of the most important,
yet contentious, issues in education today and can be assessed best
through randomized testing.159
The salient question in randomization is whether this additional
information is worth the costs, broadly assessed, of the experiments.
153. Charles Arthur, Google's Marissa Mayer on the Importance of Real-Time Search,
GUARDIAN, July 8, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jul/08/google-search-
marissa-mayer.
154. David Greenberg, Mark Shroder & Matthew Onstott, The Social Experiment Market,
13 J. ECON. PERSP. 157, 159 (1999). 
155. Id. at 160. 
156. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Relative Burdens: Family Ties and the Safety Net, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1453, 1508 (2004) (discussing different conditions that encourage recipients
of public assistance to control medical costs). 
157. President Obama’s former economic adviser, Larry Summers, has also recognized this
point. See Lawrence H. Summers, Unemployment, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Unemployment.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2011). 
158. Greenberg et al., supra note 154, at 160. 
159. For a discussion of the latest issues in the school voucher debate, see Terry M. Moe,
Beyond the Free Market: The Structure of School Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 557, 557-58 (2008). 
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Congress can build on its recent but desultory mandates for en-
couraging and evaluating experiments in the education area and
create an office modeled on the Congressional Budget Office. This
office could have the authority to recommend the insertion of
specific provisions, including funding, into legislation to evaluate
the consequences of the policies that the same legislation puts in
place.160 In this way, Congress would consider whether each piece of
legislation should include a structure for evaluating and improving
the policy it advances. Moreover, such an office could become a
clearinghouse of knowledge, translating to the public sector some of
the ideas regarding randomization that have been successful in the
private sector. 
Given that it will often be wise to delegate decisions about ran-
domization to administrative agencies, a unit within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) should develop and deploy the
expertise of the OMB to help determine the extent to which
regulation should be designed to promote such social learning.
President Obama could add a new provision establishing an office
devoted to experimentation within the confines of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which currently reviews
all regulations. Putting an office devoted to experimentation in
OIRA would be a signal that the bureaucracy should try to employ
methods of trial and error to shape government regulation.
It might be argued that it is wrong to use individuals as the
subjects of social experiments—as contemporary guinea pigs for the
benefit of future generations. But in medicine, randomized trials of
new pharmaceuticals are routinely undertaken.161 There, as here,
the justification is that we are not confident which course of action
will benefit individuals more. Randomization of social policy should
be used only when there is a genuine controversy over what social
policy to follow. Those are the general circumstances in which it is
plausible that randomization may enjoy political support.162
160. One might well consider the creation of the Congressional Budget Office itself as part
of a movement toward a politics of learning. 
161. See Richard Dolinar & S. Luke Leininger, Pay-for-Performance or Compliance? A
Second Opinion on Medicare Reimbursement, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 391, 406 (2006) (noting
that randomized trials are part of the “gold standard of evidence in evidence-based medicine”). 
162. Of course, there are limits to the permissible scope of randomization. We cannot
deprive people of settled rights for the benefit of knowledge, however great. But if the policy
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It is true that patients must voluntarily agree to medical trials
while citizens would not have the option of avoiding the randomized
regulation. But that difference results from the structure of pre-
existing legal rights. Patients have the right to refuse treatment and
thus cannot be forced to participate in a medical study. Citizens do
not have the right to refuse to follow a valid regulation and hence
can be forced to obey even a regulation that has been chosen at ran-
dom, so long as those regulations are otherwise legal. By increasing
public knowledge, policy randomization in a world of limited polit-
ical understanding can be a public good and thus provides a
justification for randomization. 
Consistent with this view, executive and judicial precedents sug-
gest that randomization is constitutional. Most dramatically, the
government instituted a lottery to determine who would be drafted
in the Vietnam War.163 While this randomization was not designed
for experimental reasons, it had far more dramatic results than the
kind of randomization policies recommended here. Some young men
faced a much higher risk of death than others as a result of a
random drawing. And this method of choice did not allocate that
risk on the basis of willingness or capacity to serve. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge
Henry Friendly, rejected the only substantial legal challenge to ran-
domization within regulatory policy for reasons of social experimen-
tation.164 In that case, New York State required family members in
the households of public recipients to engage in training or working
but imposed these requirements in only certain districts, choosing
them on a random basis.165 The court responded to the equal pro-
tection challenge by holding that the policy of social experimenta-
tion was wholly rational given the importance of experiments to
social policy.166 
options to be randomized are all within the government’s authority to provide, and if, further,
there is a reasonable basis to believe that all options included are potentially efficacious, the
individuals assigned to different programs have no constitutional or moral reason to complain.
163. See Stefen F. Feinberg, Randominzation and Social Affairs: The 1970 Draft Lottery,
171 SCIENCE 255 (1971). 
164. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1103-08 (2d Cir. 1973). Adam M. Samaha
discusses this case extensively in Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
42-43 (2009). 
165. Aguayo, 473 F.2d at 1093.
166. Id. at 1109-10. 
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3. Access to Data
Empiricism is improved by data. As such, the government should
have new, information-eliciting rules that improve data and access
to it. Over the years, the government has become more transparent,
with the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) serving as
landmark legislation in this regard.167 But the rise of empiricism
provides ever stronger rationales for making public everything
that the government does—outside of sensitive national security
matters, business trade secrets, and matters that trench on personal
privacy. Thus, government data should be posted automatically and
in machine-readable form so that it can be easily used for empirical
research and innovation in government programs. One condition on
using such data should be to make the results of any studies public
in order to avoid the reporting bias discussed below. President
Obama has made a start through his Open Government Initiative.168
It creates a presumption of transparency for data and encourages
data to be published online.169 A website, Data.gov, has already been
established to be a kind of clearinghouse for government data.170
Because of the benefits of comparing state policies, democratic
updating would benefit from similar initiatives at the state level at
least as much as at the federal level. Given that each state can
benefit from other states’ initiatives, each state initiative offering
data generates positive national externalities. Thus, the federal
government should subsidize these state initiatives on behalf of the
entire nation. 
Finally, the government should combat reporting bias in empiri-
cal studies. The problem is that researchers tend not to report and
journals tend not to publish studies that do not have statistically
significant results or otherwise have flaws.171 This practice may
make the studies that are reported unrepresentative, and thus,
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
168. See Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009);
Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of Exec.
Dep'ts & Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/
memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf.
169. Id. 
170. About, DATA.GOV, http://data.gov/about (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
171. See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 838 (2005). 
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surveys of the actual evidence in the field, like those that do meta-
analyses of all studies, may be distorted.172 Thus, as a condition of
receiving funding for a study or using a study to receive government
approval for an action, the government should require that any
study performed by the recipient or applicant be reported, whatever
the results. If necessary, the government should provide funds for
clearinghouses where the results and underlying data could be
housed. 
B. Rules for Promoting the New Media
1. Resisting Discrimination Against the New Media
As described above, dispersed media is important to aggregating
the information provided by new technologies.173 Yet the more tra-
ditional forms of media remain important to making that infor-
mation accessible to a broader audience. A politics of democratic
updating must attempt to protect this information flow. Once again,
the Supreme Court has been moving generally in this direction.
Although, as discussed above, the Court has generally limited the
scope of rights applied against the states,174 a conspicuous exception
has been made for free speech rights, including collective free
speech rights protected under the right of association.175 In fact, the
Rehnquist Court was called the most free-speech protective in
history.176
But even if the Court has amassed precedent that is friendly to
protecting the information capacity of the new media, it is likely to
grapple with at least two kinds of regulations that could potentially
interfere with such media. The first are regulations that overtly
discriminate against new media, like bloggers. For instance, such
discrimination is raised in considering whether a new law, such as
172. Id. 
173. See supra Part II.
174. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
175. See Burt Neuborne, Free Expression and the Rehnquist Court, in COMMUNICATIONS
LAW 1998, at 1273, 1276 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 04-4039, 1998).
176. Id. (“[T]he Rehnquist Court has been among the strongest free speech courts in the
nation's history.”).
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the federal shield laws for reporters, will apply to bloggers,177 as well
as how old laws, like FOIA, will apply to bloggers.178 Any discrimi-
nation between old and new media may raise First Amendment con-
cerns, because that Amendment should apply equally to everyone,
regardless of size or kind of media.179 But putting aside these
constitutional concerns, such discrimination is a policy mistake.
Even if new media like blogs are individually small, they can
rapidly grow large in the aggregate. As discussed above, they are
like a multitude of rivulets feeding into the mainstream media,
bringing specialized information and local knowledge.180 To treat
them as less important or worthy of protection reflects a misunder-
standing of how media can contribute to political learning.181
Second, some advocates of campaign finance restrictions suggest
that blog postings should be considered in some circumstances a
contribution to candidates and subject to regulation under campaign
finance law.182 Such regulation would also have a deleterious effect
on the diversity of information citizens need, because the new media
is likely to bring specialized and offbeat information to the attention
of citizens. It is precisely near elections that those with empirical
data and expertise are most needed to critique the policies and
platforms of candidates.
177. See Randall D. Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter’s Privilege, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1341, 1369 (2008).
178. Michael Russo, Are Bloggers Representatives of the News Media Under the Freedom
of Information Act?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 225, 225 (2006). 
179. See Stephanie J. Frazee, Bloggers as Reporters: An Effect-Based Approach to First
Amendment Protections in a New Age of Information Dissemination, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 609, 635 (2006). 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
181. Wikileaks—the website that has disclosed classified information from the United
States government—has raised this issue anew. See Charles Savage, After Afghan War Leaks,
Revisions in a Shield Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at A12.
182. Certain members of Congress sued the Federal Election Commission to force the
agency to extend the strictures of McCain-Feingold to the Internet. See Shays v. FEC, 337 F.
Supp. 2d 28, 65-71 (D.D.C. 2004), aff'd, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005). So far, however, the FEC
has “largely exempted the Internet.” See Bradley A. Smith, The John Roberts Salvage
Company: After McConnell, A New Court Looks To Repair the Constitution, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
891, 898 (2007).
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2. Requiring Posting of Bills Before Passage and Signing
Dispersed media can better analyze government action if that
action is made more transparent. The need to make dispersed media
even more effective calls for another set of government information-
eliciting rules—requirements that legal proposals be made publicly
available for a time period before further action is taken on them.
Before a committee vote on proposed legislation, before the vote in
the either chamber on an item on the floor, and before the President
signs a bill, the exact language at issue and all relevant amend-
ments should be posted for all to see. 
Dispersed media will then have a chance to publicize hidden
special-interest provisions in the bill and to refine the arguments for
and against the bill before it is passed or signed. Thus transparency
before legislative action facilitates social knowledge and promotes
the forces favoring encompassing interests. To be effective, however,
the time period for such analysis would not have to be lengthy,
given the ubiquity of sources for information analysis in the modern
world. Experts can opine expeditiously, and blogs will surely begin
debating immediately. Thus, useful requirements may be as short
as a week or ten days. Of course, such requirements should have
exceptions for emergencies. 
The body politic is already sensing, however inchoately, that such
rules would be beneficial. President Obama promised during his
campaign to wait for five days before signing any nonemergency
bill.183 He has not fully honored that commitment,184 but his deploy-
ment of such a promise in a presidential campaign shows the public
resonance of the notion that the polity can benefit from the more
intense information analysis provided by a period of reflection. The
current House of Representatives has required that a bill be posted
three calendar days before a vote.185 These useful ideas should be
183. See Barack Obama and Joe Biden’s Plan, CHANGE.GOV, http://change.gov/agenda/
ethics_agenda/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (“As president, Obama will not sign any non-
emergency bill without giving the American public an opportunity to review and comment on
the White House website for five days.”).
184. See Katharine Q. Seelye, White House Changes the Terms of a Campaign Pledge About
Posting Bills Online, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, at A11.
185. See H.R. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending standing rule XXI of the House). 
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expanded to require the posting of legislative proposals before every
important stage of the legislative process. 
CONCLUSION
Societies flourish in part through their ability to learn. Such
factual updating requires exploitation of the latest technology.
Technology progresses because man exploits some element of the
world, from water and fire to magnetic fields and the quantum
movement of atoms. Government structure, then, also progresses as
new technology is deployed to create better sources of information
for social decision making, including decision making about
problems created by the new technology itself. Ultimately, the
distinctive forms of government throughout history have been the
outgrowth of the human genius for material invention—a social
echo of the Promethean capture of some natural element for our
collective improvement. 
So it is today. Modern information technology has provided soci-
ety with ever-greater computational and communication capacity.
These features have given rise to more powerful information
technology, like modern empiricism, and new dispersed media.
Thus, the task of political reform is to use such technologies to
improve updating on the basis of new information they provide. Part
of this goal can be met through legal reforms that shape government
to be a better instrument of social learning. 
The same technology that is providing democracy a new capacity
for updating is also making this task more urgent. New technologies
can provide great benefits. But they can also pose new dan-
gers—from weapons of mass destruction to new forms of pollution.
Government needs to know how to act to avoid the dangers and reap
the benefits. Society’s capacity for learning must match its capacity
for change. 
